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The purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework to analyze the impacts of 
information technologies on future insurgency conflict. This objective is achieved by 
analyzing an existing communications model for internal war and identifying factors that 
will affect the use of information technology by either belligerent. These factors impact 
the ability of either the state government or insurgent organization to influence the state's 
population and international community in the struggle for state power. The factors 
identified range from the internal conductivity of a society to the type of government that 
exists within a state. Identified factors are then incorporated into the communications 
framework to act as a model to identify strengths and weaknesses within any specific 
campaign. 
This thesis also addresses the interactive nature of insurgency conflict. Depending 
upon the information technology capability of a government or an insurgent force, in 
which scenarios is it more beneficial to incorporate an offensive and in which a defensive 
strategy, given the capabilities of an opponent? This thesis is' designed to be a starting 
point for future analysis of how emerging information technologies impact the struggle 
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Infonnation technologies have transfonned nearly every aspect of the world in which 
we live. Whether the telegraph or the networked computer, tools that enable individuals, 
organizations, and their decision makers to interact and process greater amounts of 
infonnation at ~aster speeds have made an impact on everything from the optimal structure 
of organizations to the ways in which nations wage war. Just as the corporate world 
continues to expand its uses of infonnation technologies to transfonn the business 
landscape, governments are increasingly turning to these technologies to aid them in 
combating their adversaries. 
Most of the government attention has concentrated on analyzing the effects of 
information technologies in conventional state-on-state conflicts. Little attention has been 
given to examining the ways in which technology may affect internal wars. Given a 
certain level of security, will the introduction of infonnation technologies increase the 
efficiency of an undergroUnd organization? The tension between the added efficiency of 
technology employment and the. general decrease in security is essential to understanding 
the impact of infonnation technologies on internal conflict. This tension must be examined 
in both offensive and defensive tenns, as well as the point at which the technology's 
marginal returns outweigh the marginal costs, to determine the extent of the impact that 
infonnation technologies might have in an insurgency campaign. 
A. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES AND MODERN WAR 
Within most advanced societies, the military has been profoundly touched by 
developments in communications and other infonnation technologies. The swift and 
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decisive victory by Coalition Forces in the Iraq desert demonstrated the utilities of a force 
that held a distinct advantage in information technologies. These changes in the 
conduct of war have stimulated discussion of a Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) and have left historians such as Steven Metz and James Kievit comparing today's 
changes with those brought about by the advent of gunpowderl . Whether the change in 
conduct of military affairs is "revolutionary" or "evolutionary" is beyond the scope of this 
paper. What is clear, however, is that technological changes have profoundly affected 
modem military decisionmaking. 
The decision cycle depicted in Figure 1 shows the evolution of the process of 
turning information into action. In this continuous process, information is entered into 
the cycle, where it becomes intelligence: This intelligence is the basis for planners and 
decisionmakers to orient themselves to any given situation and determine their course of 
action. If an opponent can affect the accuracy or impede the information received by an 
adversary, then he has altered that adversary's decision process. Thus, as advanced 
systems rely more heavily on information to execute specific tasks and decisions, the 
systems that transport the given information become an important commodity. Although 
this process has remained intact throughout history, the speed and intensity with which it 
functions has changed dramatically. 
Figure 1 below also demonstrates how portions of the decision cycle have been 
profoundly altered by information technologies in the short history of America's military. 
Advances in technologies have created an environment in which information received is 
1 Metz, Steven and Kievit, JanIes. The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War. 
Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College. July 25, 1994. 
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now acted upon in a matter of minutes, compared to the months in Grant's or 
Washington's day. The importance of reliable and accurate information has never been 
greater than it is today. This added reliance on information has placed the decision cycle 
under stresses never before experienced and has made information and the technologies 








Figure 1. Information Benefits to the U.S. Milit~ 
Conflicts waged between states are not the only conflicts to be influenced by the 
introduction of faster information tools. Internal wars waged between states and 
insurgents are just as likely to be significantly influenced by developing technologies. 
Information technologies can provide an important instrument with which an out-gunned, 
2 Adapted from Rose, John BG, American Army Introduction to the 21st Century, given by briefer Martin 
Hill ofBooz Allen & Hamilton Inc., 1998. 
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out-manned, and generally out-resourced guerrilla force may compete for the power of a 
state. 
B. INSURGENT ORGANIZATIONS AND MODERN WAR 
Insurgencies and insurgent movements have been present as long as there have 
been state governments. Organizations and individuals that hold a disproportionately low 
or nonexistent ievel of power have often attempted to seize control of a government 
and monopolize the resources to the benefit of their constituents. The struggles of Mao, 
Ho Chi Minh, and Fidel Castro are all well documented and have resulted in the 
transformation of states from one government to a new political system in a winner-take-
all game for state power. Other more limited successes have resulted in numerous spin-
offs and fragmentations as various insurgent organizations partake in their respective 
struggles for power. 
Gordon H. McCormick, professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, designed the 
framework depicted in Figure 2, slightly modified for this purpose, to depict at the macro 
level the forces at play in an insurgent struggle within a state. The two major adversaries, 
the state and the insurgents, contend for influence over the state's population and the 
international community. The solid arrows represent communications channels attempting 
to influence through a variety of means both the populace and the international community 
by the insurgents and the existing state. The dashed arrows represent attempts to disrupt 
that influence. The arrows depicted in the framework assume different characteristics 
depending upon their respective origins and targets. 
The three arrows that extend from the state government on the model represent 
attempts to influence or control the actions or inaction of the state's population, the 
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r-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
international community, and the insurgent organization. The arrows that lead to the state 
population and international community are primarily defensive in nature. The 
government attempts to decrease tolerance for the insurgents within the population.3 The 
arrow that aims toward the insurgents is primarily offensive. The state takes aggressive 
actions to limit the disruption that the insurgents can cause to the state's ability to function 
legitimately and efficiently. The actions taken usually fall to the military or police 
apparatus of a state; dest~ction, force, and arrest are the primary tools employed. 
? 
~---------- -----~. 
--.. -------_ .... 
.. ---
.. .? ...... 1---------. 
-_ ..... 
------:--
Figure 2. The Communication Needs of an Insurgence4 
Of the three arrows emanating from the insurgent organization, two are offensive 
in nature and the other defensive. The insurgents attempt to change the status quo by 
influencing both the state's population and the international community. These actions, 
3 Leites, Nathan, and Wolf, Charles Jr. Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent 
Conflicts. (RAND, February 1970). 
4 This model is presented in the "Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare". 
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usually offensive, can range from image management to open acts of terrorism against the 
state's population. The arrow that points from the insurgents to the state government is 
operationally defensive in nature, as is the one describing internal communications. Rebels 
use covert and secretive techniques to remain anonymous to the standing 
government, preventing government forces from eliminating them through arrest, 
expulsion, or death. This secrecy is a major component in the insurgents' ability to remain 
viable in the face of government forces that out-gun, out-man, and generally, out-resource 
them. 
Secrecy is an essential ingredient for the insurgents' success. Direct confrontation 
is related to the government's ability to identify or "see" the insurgents. Once the 
guerrilla group can be identified, the government can "hit" it with a variety of weapons, 
ranging from prison time or expulsion: to actual physical destruction of individual 
guerrillas. This "see-hit"S relationship is essential to the understanding of the likelihood of 
success or failure of an internal war. All things being equal, the more anonymous 
insurgents can remain, the more likely they are to be successful in their battle to obtain 
power. The more likely it is that the government can identify the guerrilla, the more likely 
the government will be able to eliminate the opposition and remain in power. Anonymity, 
however, is not free. The security of an insurgent group directly affects the efficiency with 
. which it is able to accomplish its mission of replacing the standing government. 
J. Bowyer Bell has discussed the inherent inefficiency in the secrecy in which 
insurgents must conduct their actions. According to Bell, an inverse ratio exists between 
5 Notes, "Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare" at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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secrecy and efficiency: absolute secrecy guarantees that nothing works properly.6 A 
guerrilla force must communicate to operate. An idea not communicated is worthless to 
any insurgent cause. Whether communication is among rebels or between the insurgents 
and the international community, the exchange of information must take place for ideas to 
spread. However, communicating requires that the rebels expose themselves to forces 
that oppose them. As insurgents gain strength through the indigenous support of the 
population or the exogenous support of foreign actors, they increasingly defy and 
challenge the government in open confrontation. Every rebel who attempts to 
communicate may provide the essential information that exposes his identity to the state. 
The underground is inherently more inefficient than a government that does not operate in 
such an oppressive environment. 
Information technologies have generally increased the efficiency with which 
organizations are able to receive, process, and act upon information. The insurgency 
model depicted in Figure 2 outlines the communications requirements within any insurgent 
struggle. These communication requirements seem absurdly simple until the underground 
organization's security constraints are considered. Will the' underground remain as 
inefficient with the introduction of information tools? What factors will influence the use 
of information technologies within an internal struggle? Where will the relative advantage 
lie when marginal costs are compared to marginal returns? In what situations will it be 
more conducive to employ offensively or defensively oriented information systems within 
an insurgency or counterinsurgency campaign? 
6 Bell, J. Bowyer. "Aspects of the Dragon World: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem," 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Volume 3, Number 1. 
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C •. METHODOLOGY AND APPROACHES 
In asking the question, "How will information technologies affect insurgent 
organizations?", this research develops an existing framework to identify factors relevant 
to the future uses of information technologies in internal wars. The focus is on the tension 
generated by the introduction of tools that increase efficiency in an environment that is 
inherently inefficient due to security concerns. This research uses the previously presented 
insurgency-counterinsurg~ncy framework to identify the communications requirements of 
an internal war and ,to identify those factors that influence an insurgent group's ability to 
use information technologies to meet these requirements. The analysis then examines 
where the relative advantages or disadvantages lie with respect to a specific internal war. 
The relative advantages are examined interactively, the state versus the guerrillas, to 
determine how relative strengths and weaknesses affect the strategy employed by an 
opponent. 
. This research is exploratory. It would be naive to believe that it will provide the 
definitive analytic model on the effects of information technologies on internal wars. As 
the information era brings rapid changes to societies and their war-fighting capabilities, the 
techniques and tactics of internal war Will change just as rapidly. This analysis should be 
used as a starting point for future research to determine both the possible tactics and 
countermeasures of specific counterinsurgency campaigns. 
D. A LOOK AHEAD 
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter II develops the factors that impact 
the uses of information technologies on an internal conflict. Factors are identified using 
the insurgency-counterinsurgency framework as the basis of determining the 
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communications requirements of both the state and the insurgent organization. The 
factors are intended to develop a starting point for future research into the possible 
advantages held by both the state and the insurgent organization. They are used to 
develop the framework and specify determinants of possible relative advantages or 
disadvantages that may exist with regard to both the insurgents and the state. 
Chapter III examines where the relative advantages lies within any insurgency 
conflict. This chapter looks at both high- and low-technology insurgents and state 
governments to illuminate under what circumstances the use of information technologies 
may serve as an advantage or a liability, depending upon the adversary's capability. This 
chapter also looks at circumstances in which the need for more defensive approaches are 
necessary. Circumstances in which the relative advantage may lie in the employment of 
more offensively oriented technologies are also discussed. The offensive-defensive 




II. INFLUENTIAL FACTORS IN THE USE OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGIES 
This analysis begins with the factors that influence the employment of technology 
within a society under siege. The McCormick Model (Figure 2) framework of the 
communications requirements within an insurgency campaign is used to identify the 
elements that contribute to the potential use of information tools to affect the outcome of 
a sub-state conflict. A macro level analysis of this nature discounts much of the cultural 
and societal specifics that significantly affect the everyday working environment of 
insurgents and their organizations. Designed as an overview of insurgences, this chapter 
excludes discussions of the societal customs, mores, and beliefs that play a significant part 
of any analysis of specific insurgences past, present, or in the future. 
As critical factors are identified, they will be added to the framework. This list of 
factors is a starting point in the analysis of any ongoing or potential insurgency campaign; 
it can be used to determine the capability of technologies to change the outcome of a 
campaign. The identified factors are not intended to be all-inclusive. As new technologies 
emerge and the societies they affect develop and mature, further analysis should be 
conducted to identify any new salient elements. With this restriction, here are the factors 
that are prevalent in the environment in which all insurgents must operate. 
A. INTERNAL INSURGENT COMMUNICATIONS 
.. 
Every insurgent group is faced with the need to communicate. From the everyday 
orders and directions issued from the junior leaders of the organization to the strategic 
goals promulgated by the leadership, each underground organization is faced with the task 
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of sending and receiving messages, both on the individual and collective level. The ability 
to communicate successfully can mean the difference between an inefficient and soon-to-
be nonexistent organization and an entity that triumphs to lead a nation. The insurgents 
must balance the inefficiencies of running an organization that is highly secretive on the 
one hand while creating an organization that is effective on the other.1 This process 
evolves through an interactive process with uncertainty brought on by the actions and 
reactions of the government as well as those whom they are attempting to govern. 
There are numerous environmental factors that play a role in an insurgency 
struggle and have an impact on its organizational development. The first and foremost is 
the security of the organization. Unlike any other organization, a guerrilla force must 
constantly be concerned for the safety of its individuals as well as organizational security 
and safety. Insurgent organizations operate in a ·hazardous environment, with 
governments continuously attempting to eliminate them through arrest, expulsion, and/or 
death. The business world, which may concern itself with the security of property rights 
or trade secrets, deals with security issues that pale in comparison to the life and death 
struggle that the guerrilla faces. The possibility of death permeates every rebel action from 
day to day living arrangements to the strategic planning of the organization. While 
secondary to the constant security concerns, there are other elements that influence the 
. guerrilla's organizational life. 
1 Bell, J. Bowyer. "Aspects of the Dragon World: Covert Communications and the Rebel Ecosystem," 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Volume 3, Number 1. 
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The means by which a society communicates as a whole also affects the insurgents' 
organizational environment. Communications can range from the person-to-person variety 
found throughout less-developed nations to the technology-rich environment found in 
highly industrialized parts of the world. Guerrillas can only use the means available within 
their working environment to communicate throughout their organization. The use of 
information technologies by only rebel elements of a society acts as an indicator to the 
guerrillas' identities. Insurgents spend much of their time attempting to blend into the 
society around them and are therefore restricted to the information tools available to other 
members of the society. Thus, the internal conductivity of a society plays an import.ant 
role in the tools that the rebels have at their disposal. 
Uncertainty is a constant reality in an insurgency struggle. The very nature of the 
struggle is based on the attempt to overthrow the existing government. Although many 
actions and reactions may be predicted or assumed in any adversarial endeavor,. their 
certainty in degree and scope can have an impact on the insurgency in both positive and 
negative ways. Because of the uncertain environment, more information is needed to 
drive the decisions and actions of the organization. However, more information requires 
more security risk. The insurgents are therefore faced with two environmental factors that 
work against each other. On the one hand, the uncertain environment requires more 
information, and on the other hand, gaining more information means risking security. 
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The first effects of information technologies on an organization are likely to be felt 
at the top. The leadership, or as Henry Mintzberg labeled it the "strategic apex"/ will be 
changed with the implementation of information technologies. The sheer amount of 
information available at the highest levels of an organization has the potential to be 
overwhelming. The strategic apex is faced with a choice between drowning in a sea of 
information or adapting the structural form of the organization to this newfound resource. 
There are many routes an organization can take to deal with this potentially 
overwhelming influx of information. The one chosen depends upon the individual 
leadership of the organization. Leaders who are driven by high power and control needs 
are less likely to decentralize the decision process. Mintzberg mentions that besides the 
"information overload" scenario there exists two other main reasons for decentralization: 
1) it allows the organization to respond quickly to local conditions; and 2) it is a stimulus 
for motivation3. Both these reasons are applicable to the insurgent organization with its 
desire to out-govern the standing government and to end the time of living as hunted 
individuals. The amount of decentralization, however, is dependent upon how much 
power a leader is willing to concede to his subordinates.4 
Whether an insurgent group is centralized or. decentralized is in many respects 
dependent both upon the individual leadership of the group and the motivations behind the 
2 Mintzberg, Henry, Structure in Fives: Designing Effective Organizations, Prentice Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J., 1993, p. 9. 
3 Mintzberg, pp. 96-97. 
4 Burton, Richard M. and Odel, Borge. Strategic Organizational Diagnosis and Design: Developing 
Theory for Application. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston, 1996. 
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group altogether. Organizations whose strategic thoughts and directions come 
only from one individual are less likely to decentralize. There is a core, or inner circle, of 
colleagues that may influence the leader, but rarely is the decision process truly open to 
the junior leadership of the orgatiization. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are those organizations motivated by a central 
theme such as nationalism or separatist ideology; they are much more likely to decentralize 
in the face of overwhelming informa~ion flows. When an organization and its individuals 
are motivated by a common, agreed-upon theme, there is much more latitude for decision 
making because of the shared expectation that any actions of individuals will be in line 
with organizational goals. 
1. The Factors That Influence the Use of Information Technologies by 
Insurgent Organizations 
It can be deduced from this discussion that three factors influence the use of 
information technologies by an insurgent organization. These three factors--internal 
conductivity, leadership, and the information threat posed by the standing government--are 
discussed in further detail below. 
a. Internal Conductivity 
Internal conductivity is the type and amount of communication that occurs 
within a society on a daily basis. The internal conductivity of a society will be a strong 
determinant as to whether an insurgent group is likely or not to employ information 
technologies to meet its organizational demands. This should not imply that every 
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household of a society has to be hard wired before information technologies will be 
employed by insurgents, although a completely wired nation could greatly aid rebels in 
their day-to-day communication needs. Societies that already possess a vast wealth of 
information tools provide insurgents with a rich set of available weapons to meet their 
communication needs.. These societies also present environments in which the insurgents' 
communications are more likely to get lost in the plethora of messages, or "noise," that is 
transmitted daily. On the other hand, societies with antiquated or slowly developing 
information tools may be more vulnerable to, and susceptible to, sudden exposure to new 
information technologies, but their long term uses open the insurgents to the reactions of 
government forces. 
b. Leadership 
The leadership of an insurgent organization is a determining factor in how 
information technologies will be employed by a rebel group. Besides the limitations of his 
own technical experience and competence, the potential future statesman also must 
contend with how much power he is willing to relinquish. in the pursuit of the 
organizational goals. 5 The leader of an organization may be willing to relinquish a vast 
amount of power in the initial stages of an insurgency to gain notoriety and popular 
support for his cause. However, as the likelihood of success grows, the leader may 
consolidate and centralize many decisions' to insure that only those truly deserving are 
5 Burton, Richard M. and Odel, Borge. Strategic Orf7illlimtional Diagnosis and Design: Developing 
Theory for Application. Kluwer Academic Publishers: Boston, 1996. 
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offered the rewards at the end of the battle.6 If an insurgent group does employ 
information tools to meet its communication needs, the organization is likely to be 
decentralized and more greatly dispersed. A decentralized organization is likely to be 
smaller and more professional then its centralized counterpart. The will, goals, and 
aspirations of the insurgent leadership has always been, and is likely to remain, an 
important factor in determining the extent to which a rebel employs information 
technologies. 
c. Security Threat 
Because of the security risk that every rebel lives with on a daily basis, the 
security threat that the government forces pose against information tools will have an 
impact on the likelihood of their use. No information tool is as important as the continued 
existence of the organization. The use of information tools is likely to become a cat and 
mouse game between insurgents and the state. Insurgents will use a peculiar information· 
technology until the threat of exposure or compromise becomes so great that they are 
forced to move to another tool to meet their communication needs. Thus the disparity 
between the states' information technologies and the insurgents' becomes paramount. 
States that hold an edge in the use of information tools are likely to be able to identify, 
eliminate, or counter an insurgent group's undeveloped information technology much 
more quickly. On the other hand, insurgents who hold a technical advantage are likely to 
be' able to employ the same means to communicate for a much longer time before 
changing. 
, 6 Notes, "Seminar on Guerrilla Warfare" at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
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The three factors identified above as determinants of how information 
technologies meet the internal communication needs of the insurgent organizations will be 
added to the framework. These factors will play a significant role in determining to what. 
extent information technologies will meet the organizational communication needs of the 
insurgents. 
B. COMMUNICATING WITH THE STATE'S POPULATION 
There is no other resource as important to both the government and a struggling 
insurgency as the support of the people. All things being equal, the greater the popular 
support for an insurgence, the more effective the organization. Ernesto "Che" Guevara, a 
renowned insurgent from the late 1950s until his death in 1967, said, "to try and carry out 
[a guerrilla war] without the support of the population is a prelude to inevitable disaster.,,7 
The support of the people for a revolutionary cause has claimed the governing rights of 
states such as China, Iran, and, more recently, Poland. The step from disgruntled 
populace to revolutionary force is not an easy one. The ''will'' ofa state's population must 
be captured and used as an instrument to change the governing apparatus. As political 
scientists such as Theda Skocpol8 and Chalmers Johnson9 debate the origins and causes of 
revolution, a new instrument has been developed that may aid rebel organizations in 
garnering popular support. 
Prior analysis of state revolution has concentrated on the specific cultural and 
7 Guevara, Emesto, Guerrilla Warfare, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985, pp. 48-51. 
8 Skocpol, Theda, Social Revolution in the Modem World, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994. 
9 Johnson, Chalmers, Revolutionary Change (2nd Ed.), Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982. 
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societal attributes that significantly contribute to changing a state's governmental status. 
Although the study of cultural characteristics remains important to the discussion of any 
particular revolution, a study at the macro level, such as this one, must step back to 
analyze causes that have promoted change across the entire spectrum of state 
systems. 
The following discussion is restricted to factors that can be found across cultural 
and political ideologicallin~s in order to determine where the use of information tools may 
aid the state or insurgents in an internal war. 
An underground organization attempts to solicit support for its cause among a 
state's population. The insurgents attempt to promote and articulate a vision of how a 
state will run under rebel leadership. To do this, the rebels essentially attempt to out-
govern the government. The insurgents use rhetoric that disparages a standing 
government while inflating their own successes. This disparaging rhetoric is designed to 
tear down trust, confidence, and support for an existing government while glorifying and 
magnifying the attributes of the underground organization. This is one area where the 
insurgents hold an advantage over a standing government. Confidence for a standing 
government is based on the governmene s bureaucratic actions. Confidence in a guerrilla 
organization is based a theoretic vision. Realities usually tend to be much harsher than 
dreams. 
Attempts to influence a state's population take on 'different characteristics 
depending on which element, the standing state or insurgent organization, is attempting to 
influence the populace. The insurgents must change the status quo. This need to change 
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an already standing system implies that the rebels must take aggressive or offensive action 
to promote or change a citizen's allegiance. Popular support equates to resources for an 
insurgency. Added resources can come in the fonn of financial aid, equipment, or the 
simple silence of the populace when faced with an order from a standing government. 
This need to be aggressive by the insurgents gives them reason to use any means at their 
disposal. Failure will result in the destruction of the organization. 
The state, in its a~empt to control the population, must hold onto the status quo. 
Its actions toward the populace are fundamentally more defensive in nature. A state 
strives to quench, not inflame, the revolutionary passions of its constituents. This should 
not imply a passiveness or apathy toward the citizens. The population can hold vital 
pieces of infonnation that the government can use to "see" the insurgents as well as other 
resources that are essential to the government in its war campaign. A supportive populace 
is the best defense for a struggling government. Aggressive or cruel treatment toward a 
member of the state by governmental representatives is likely to receive ample publicity 
from the struggling insurgents. This negative publicity does not have to be truthful to 
meet the needs of the guerrillas. 
How a state's population communicates internally will determine how and if 
information technologies can be used to promote the beliefs and causes of both the 
standing government and an insurgent organization. Internal communications can range 
from the jungle grapevine that existed in Vietnam to the interconnected, hard-wired, 
multiple media found within many industrial countries. In societies where vast sources are 
available to reach and influence citizens, insurgents can pick and choose the mode in 
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which they attempt to connect potential followers. These multimedia societies provide 
insurgents with an ability to alter the means used to communicate with citizens, allowing 
them to vary their approaches based on a medium's security. In societies where the 
information sources are antiquated, the ability of the guerrillas to change attitudes by using 
information technologies is much more limited. A computer in the hands of rebels that is 
unable to communicate with any other citizens' computers is useless. Likewise, a 
government that has the ability to track cybermedia is useless if the guerrillas do not 
possess or use this capability. In these situations rebels may have to rely on the face-to-
face communications found in many portions of the underdeveloped world. 
The day-to-day interactivity of government representatives and the society can also 
affect whether information technologies are likely to be useful to a revolutionary cause. 
The interactivity can be as simple as police officers in the streets, infrastructure under 
construction, or any activity that demonstrates the government is working for' the 
community. Any state in which the efforts of a government are easily identifiable to its 
citizens is less likely to be affected by disparaging information spread by rebels via 
sophisticated information tools. There is a tension, however, between the amount and 
type of exposure the citizens have to a standing government. Exposure of the government 
to the populace provides ample opportunities for an overaggressive or simply negligent act 
.by a civil employee to be amplified by an advertising rebel. This concept implies that in 
areas of a country where the government presence is less dominate, insurgents are much 
more likely to be able to influence the local population. 
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The type of governmental system also plays a role as to how and if an information 
tool can influence a society. An open government, one that is developed through an 
electoral process, will be less likely to be affected by advances in information technology 
within its borders. These societies express their opinions at the ballot box. Information 
technologies uSed efficiently have the potential to overwhelm a population with 
information. Tools such as the Internet provide a resource where almost any type or 
amount of information can be found on any subject. In a society where free speech is the 
norm, citizens build up an immunity .to negative government information. Likewise, in 
societies where negative government press is forbidden, a seemingly minor government 
indiscretion publicized by an insurgent is likely to have a greater impact. All things being 
equal, the more open a society, the less likely the impact of information technologies. 
1. The Factors That Influence the Insurgents' Use of Information 
Technologies 
Two main factors determine the use of information technologies to influence a 
state's population by an insurgent organization: 
a. Availability of Information Technologies to a State's Population 
The introduction of an information technology by insurgents that is not 
available to the remainder of a society serves no purpose. The only tools available for use 
by insurgents are those that are already present within a society at large. This factor can 
be determined by looking at the standard ways in which a state's citizenry obtains its daily 
news. Information tools range from the Internet-connected computer to a clandestine 
radio station that beams a revolutionary message to possible supporters. In a society that 
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receives its infonnation via word of mouth, insurgents have little choice but to spread their 
revolutionary rhetoric via the same means. In societies in which there are limited types of 
technologies that are used to distribute information, insurgents face limited means to ' 
espouse their rhetoric. 
h. Government - Society Interactivity 
There is variability in the amount and type of interaction between the 
society at large and the government. If the insurgents' infonnation can be distributed 
unhindered, government-society interactivity has an impact on that infonnation. In a 
society in which government representation is apparent on a daily basis, the insurgents 
face a tougher, although target rich, opponent. The omnipresent state stands as a more 
formidable opponent. The state's ability to communicate with a society and receive 
feedback from constituents allows it to paint a more accurate depiction of underground 
activity. . This government-society relationship is essential to the insurgents' ability to 
affect a population with its rhetoric. Although these states may stand as more formidable 
opponents, they also provide a target-rich· environment for struggling insurgents. 
Overzealous acts by government officials can be used to support the insurgents'. cry for a 
change in the government. The respect, or lack thereof, for government officials within a 
society is an indicator of the likely effects of infonnation spread by insurgents to the 
society at large. 
2. The Existing Government and the Use of Information Technologies 
Two factors determine the likely effects of information technologies on a state's 
population by a standing government: 
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a. Government Responsiveness 
The ability of a government to respond to disgruntled members of society 
determines the likelihood of its successfully using information technologies in its battle 
against insurgent forces. The feedback a government receives, no matter the source, is 
worthless unless it can react to it. Responsiveness, or the illusion of responsiveness, 
allows the government to give the impression that it is working for a society. Although 
responsiveness may alleviate some of the short-term pressure a government experiences, 
the long-term expense in terms of government resources can potentially aid insurgents in 
wearing down the stronger adversary. If there is no mechanism for responding to 
disgruntled members of a state, a government stands ripe for the insurgents' actions and 
the information tools they employ. 
h. Political System 
This factor refers to the type of political system already in place and the 
amount of openness within that system. Whether a state's political system is open or 
closed determines a government's ability to respond a.dequately when information 
technologies are used by insurgent forces to influence a state's population. An open 
government is likely to possess some skills in managing its own image. Disparaging 
information, no matter the source, is likely to be addressed and countered in a society 
where a government stands accountable to its public. A closed system, in which 
disparaging information against the government is not allowed, will not respond 
adequately. If a government normally has open discussions of its policies, it develops the 
, 
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skills and attributes that will be essential if the insurgents' information barrage develops. 
Systems that do not face criticism on a regular basis are likely to be ovelWhelmed if a 
revolutionary information barrage begins. These governments possess ·an inclination to 
lash out against disparaging information, an act that has the potential of aiding an 
insurgent movement by providing information that can be used against the government. 
C. COMMUNICATING WITH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 
Both belligerents, the state and the insurgents, bid for legitiImtcy and recognition 
within the international community. Although not a prerequisite for success, international 
recognition and support can have an enormous impact on the likelihood of success. one 
only needs to contemplate the outcome of the American Revolution without French 
support or the consolidation of Vietnam without the aid of the U.S.S.R. to appreciate the 
importance of international support. Although the need for support has always been a 
significant factor in the outcome of an internal war, today's information technologies 
provide greater opportunities for both parties to influence the international community. 
This research confines itself to the internal conflict that consists of a state 
government and internal insurgency. This study does not ventUre into what Larry Cable 
defines as "partisan war," in which combatants from a third nation are used to conduct the 
conflict within a nation.8 This notion would significantly cloud the analysis, although the 
basic factors would remain the same. With this restriction in mind, the influential factors 
are discussed below. 
8 Cable, Larry E., Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the 
Vietnam War, New York University Press, 1986, p. 5. 
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The insurgents and the state compete for legitimacy within the international 
community. The insurgents attempt to garner international support for their cause and for 
recognition. The government also attempts to solicit support, which would allow the 
government greater freedom of action to combat the insurgents. Both parties attempt to 
present a favorable image of their respective organizations and insure that their story is 
told in the most sympathetic manner. 
The government ~d the insurgents both attempt to manage their images in order 
to put the most resp~ctable light on their actions. Early in any insurgence, the state uses 
terms such as "outlaws," "criminals," and "terrorists" to convey to the world that the 
disturbances are of a criminal nature and not political. V sing terms that convey criminal 
images to the international arena lends credence to the state's claim that its responses are 
justified to uphold law and order. On the other hand, the rebels use terms such as 
"freedom fighters" and "insurgents" to promote an image of justification and legitimacy. 
Both parties try to manage their respective images to present the most positive picture of 
the situation. Managing the perceptions of the conflict is accomplished through the 
information that flows from the besieged region and is received by the international 
community. 
The type and amount of information that flows from a state under siege is a 
relevant element in the presentation of the belligerent group's image to the international 
community. Large amounts of information from multiple sources offer a more accurate 
picture of the situation within an embattled region. Numerous sources of information add 
credibility to a particular side of a story. However, areas in which source-rich and 
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quantity-rich flows of information collect are less likely to be influenced by the impact of a 
new source. In a high "noise" environment, a new source is more likely to get lost or 
diluted by the multiple counter arguments already present. States where a monopoly on 
public information is held (such as a government-administered news agency) are much 
more susceptible to the likely effects of information technologies. Freedom of the press 
doesn't necessarily promote multiple sources of information. Societies that possess 
monopolized information are more likely to be susceptible to the introduction of 
information technologies that have the ability to overwhelm the already present single 
information source. Likewise, states where information is distributed from multiple 
sources are less likely to be severely impacted by new information tools. 
The state and the insurgents do not start on equal terms in terms of credibility of 
the information source. Few, if any, sources are held as more credible than the head of a 
state presenting a personal interpretation of an event. The legitimacy of an individual, a 
position, and a nation are all rolled into the words and actions of one talking head of state. 
A state leader will always be initially more credible than any insurgent. However, 
information technologies provide a tool that allows for a more open debate, one that can 
narrow the disparity between the head of state and the insurgency leader. Today's 
insurgency leader can enter a domestic debate from anywhere in the world, providing him 
with an over-the-horizon capability while" he remains relatively secure. Information 
technologies, especially networked computers, allow insurgency leaders to debate relevant 
issues or express their individual and group proposals to a society. News conferences 
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with multiple media attendees organized by insurgent groups was an unthinkable prospect 
in the past due to security concerns by the secretive organizations. 
Multiple sources of information include more than just the government and the 
media. Non-Government Agencies (NGOs) and Private Organizations (PVOs) also 
provide information. NGOs and PVOs have developed a networked capability that allows 
for greater and faster information flows into many less-developed portions of the world. A 
globally connected NGO may be the sole source of information flowing from an embattled 
state to the international community. Short-term technologies provided by visiting NGOs 
or the introduction of minimal technologies could have an: overwhelming effect on' a 
conflict where both the insurgents and the state hold little information technology 
maturity. Beyond the sources of information technologies introduced by outsiders, the 
information resources already present within a country play a significant role in the quest 
for international attention. 
The information technologies available within a state under siege have a significant 
impact on their use and thus the outcome of a conflict. States that have no or limited 
exposure to informational technologies are regions where the' effects will be felt more 
deeply. This holds true for both a society, of which the insurgents are a subset, and for 
government elements. This technology ratio between a society and its government 
presents another factor that should be analyzed to understand the impact of using 
information tools in a conflict. 
Information technologies are a by-product of advanced business practices. The 
three entities--Iocal business, society as a whole, and government--do not advance in their 
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uses of information technologies at the same rate. If both the government and society 
have advanced in their uses of information technologies at generally the same rate, no 
comparative advantage can be gained from the use of information technologies. However, 
if the society has· advanced farther in its uses of new information tools than the 
government, then the insurgents are likely to hold a comparative advantage. If neither the 
government or business has advanced to any significant level, the sudden introduction of 
information tools by either. side could have a large initial impact. Still, if a technology is 
not present, this does not prevent the use of cut-outs or other elements operating outside 
the state's borders to attempt to influence the international community from afar. Again, 
this over-the-horizon capability .provides both an immediate expansion in the insurgents' 
capabilities while providing little denigration in their organizational security. 
The ability to cause quantifiable, credible information to flow to the international 
community is essential to either the state's or the insurgents' capture .of international· 
attention and legitimacy within the world community. Three factors for both the 
insurgents and the state are presented below to analyze the potential impacts of 
information technologies on the battle. 
1. The Insurgents' Use of Information Technologies 
The following three factors should be considered when analyzing the effects of 
information technologies in an internal war. These factors are important to both parties 
involved in the conflict: the insurgents and the state in their respective attempts to acquire 
international support. 
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a. External Connectivity 
External connectivity encompasses the ability of infonnation to flow 
from and to the region in conflict. This can be studied in tenns of purely technical . 
conduits, such as external communication lines, or in tenns of the exposure of the region 
to members of the international community, the individuals from the world community 
who pass through and expose the internal society to new technologies. The higher the 
conductivity, as in more outside lines or more exposure to the international community, 
the higher the likelihood that the international community will receive and be influenced by 
the infonnation from the region. 
h. Sources of Information 
The number of sources of infonnation operating from a region affects the 
credibility and potential influence of the insurgents' offerings. The larger the number of 
sources, the less likely the insurgents will be able to influence the infonnation's credibility. 
A single-source society is an easier target for credibility attacks by the insurgents. The 
more information available from a region, whether true or false, the more noise is added to 
the system, which increases the likelihood of the insurgents' information being diluted. 
The lower the number of sources, the less noise, and the more likely the insurgents can 
have a significant effect on the presentation of the conflict. The insurgents in a 
multi source infonnation environment must provide more credible infonnation than the 
government's sources, which have an initial advantage in credibility. 
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c. Society/Government Technology Ratio 
The society/government technology ratio describes the disparity between 
the insurgents' information capabilities and a standing government's. A government 
possesses advantages not afforded to the insurgents. However, information technologies 
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provide an ability to flood the international community with information that has the 
potential to favorably influence world opinion. Flooding the world community with 
positive. information pro~des the insurgents with political maneuvering space that may 
limit the physical r~sponse a government takes toward them. Information favoring the 
insurgents in an internal conflict can severely hamper the options a government can take. 
A government with as high an information technology capability can counter and dilute 
much of the information distributed by the insurgents· and thus eliminate it as a tool in the 
guerrillas' arsenal. Again, the higher the society/government technology ratio, the more 
susceptible the government is to information that can damage its legitimacy in the 
international community. 
2. The Existing Government's Use of Information Technologies 
a. Sources of Information 
The number of information sources communicating from a region affects 
the credibility and potential influence that an influx of government information may have 
on a conflict. The higher the number of sources within a society, the less likely that the 
government will be affected by the use of information technologies in an internal war. T~e 
more societal sources of information, the more scrutiny a government comes under on a 
daily basis. The addition of a new source in an already overflowing information system is 
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likely to have little effect. This new information may dilute the information already 
present, but it is unlikely to provide the ability to earn the legitimacy desired. A free press 
is a likely indicator of multiple sources of information; however this does not account for 
the monopolized information systems that are present in many parts of the world. In 
societies that have only limited numbers of information sources, as in only one newspaper, 
or one or two official news agencies, the likelihood that emerging information 
technologies will have a significant impact remains a higher possibility. 
b. Government/Society Technology Ratio 
This factor addresses the disparity between a standing government's 
information capabilities and the insurgents'. The government does not have to hold an 
advantage in this ratio to negate the effects of a robust insurgency information technology 
advantage. The government is afforded some advantages that the insurgents are not 
afforded in the world community. As long as a government has the capability to dilute the 
insurgents' influx of new information, the government will win out in the long run with the 
advantages afforded to the state in the world community. How high this ratio needs to be 
is directly relevant to both the individual state and the insurgent group. States that hold a 
higher and more creditable standing in the world community will require this ratio to be 
lower for this factor to affect an insurgency campaign. 
c. Government Exposure to International Community 
This factor looks at the standing and credibility a government possesses 
within the world community. Exposure to the world may be a result of a natural resource 
or geographic position in the world. Great economic powers are more likely to possess 
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the capability to discredit or nullify disparaging information presented by the insurgents 
within its borders. The more interaction with the world community, the more 
opportunities a standing government has to build on its quest for legitimacy. This 
exposure is built over time as the legitimacy of a government and its governmental system 
are solidified in the world community through consistency and years of interaction. States 
that remain isolated or do not possess a natural resource that is wanted by the world 
community are less likely to enjoy international exposure. Less exposure equates to less 
legitimacy and thus becoming a more likely target of the effects that information 
technologies have in denigrating the legitimacy of a standing government. 
D. THE STATE GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE INSURGENTS 
The battle that takes place between the state and the insurgents is a one-on-one 
confrontation unlike the struggle waged through the proxy of a state's population or the 
international community. This confrontation takes on many of the characteristics of a 
classical military confrontation pitting the insurgents against the military or police forces 
of a state. The militarily superior state attempts to search out and destroy the insurgents, 
who attempt to remain unrecognized until the time and place of their choosing. 
The two parties of the conflict take on different characteristics in the battle for 
power. The state acts aggressively. The offensively oriented state gathers intelligence to 
identify the rebels within its citizenry. Once identification is accomplished, combating the 
under-armed and ill-equipped rebels is done easily. Segregation, isolation, and other 
techniques are used by government forces to eliminate the insurgent force. The insurgents 
act passively, attempting to remain anonymous to their counterpart. Successful guerrillas 
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only appear at the times and places of their choosing. These times and places are usually 
when the rebels hold a distinct advantage over governmental forces. These offensive and 
defensive characteristics are in many respects transferred to the information technologies 
that each party employs. 
The insurgents.' use of information technologies is determined by their need to 
defend themselves. Systems that allow an insurgent to communicate while not divulging 
his identity will take precedence over systems that merely pass information. Security 
within a system, safeguarding sources and identities, is more important than the 
comfortable redundancy of duplicate systems. Once an information technology has been 
exposed as a revolutionary tool, a rebel organization is likely to shift to a different 
technology to remain transparent to government forces. Which system the insurgents will 
choose depends upon what other systems are available within a society. With the 
explosion of available information systems throughout the world, insurgents face a .future 
in which their choices are multiplying. 
To a government, the security of individual identification within a system is of little 
importance. However, the interruption or denigration of an entire information system 
remains of paramount concern in the midst of an internal conflict. An information system 
hindered by a guerrilla attack affects a state's ability to govern as well as its legitimacy in 
the eyes of its constituents. With redundant systems, little denigration occurs in 
government services. Slight inconveniences are likely to be tolerated by a society; the 
complete loss of services will not. 
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Information technologies that aid the government or the insurgents are not without 
their limitations. Dependence on any single information system indicates a vulnerability, a 
necessity for use in the accomplishment of some organizational task. This necessity, and 
thus the system itself, presents a healthy target for any adversary. Set aside any disbelief 
in the possibility, and imagine the destruction to our government's prestige if every 
information system within the Social Security Administration failed to work. Reliance 
instills habits. Habits are the nature of bureaucratic work. Asking a government service 
employee to adapt to a disruption in an information system is preparation for inevitable 
disaster. 
Even an adaptive organization, however, is hindered by changes or disruptions to 
its information systems. A worker or organization that is continually changing or 
rectifying system errors will naturally become reactive rather than proactive. When a 
government faces an adversary that is allowed to pick the time and place ·for 
confrontation, it must continue to strive to remain proactive in the face of such misfortune. 
Adapting information systems in the midst of confrontation forces either a government or 
the insurgents down a reactive path, which is a sure indicator of disaster. 
The reliance on intelligence is essential to the government's ability to identify a 
rebel force within its society. Information technologies that collect, collate, and even 
decipher data will provide a state with a much-needed weapon in its arsenal. If this data is 
available, it will offer a state an accurate picture of a secret organization's traits. 
However impressive redundancy in itself may be, organizing it remains a key to a state's 
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intelligence-gathering, machinery. Data not collaborated becomes vulnerable to vicious 
actions against a state's security apparatus. 
The civil liberties held sacred within a society can also affect the extent to which 
information technologies can have an impact in an internal war. Whether it is the freedom 
of the press, freedom of speech, or the privacy of individual citizens, any civil liberty 
valued by the people can affect the means by which both the insurgents and the 
government attack their adversaries. These civil liberties may limit the ability of a 
government to crack down on its individual citizens. Likewise, these civil liberties may 
provide the legal basis that the rebels may hide behind as they broadcast their 
revolutionary rhetoric. The mere presence of such liberties is not enough to hinder a 
government's response, however, as numerous countries have temporally suspended 
liberties in the face of confrontation. 
Based upon the characteristics of a direct state versus insurgents battle, the factors 
that are likely to influence how and when information technologies will affect a particular 
internal struggle are discussed below. 
1. The Direct Battle Between the Insurgents and the State 
The following two factors should be analyzed to determine what impact 
information technologies may have in any particular internal war. These factors are 
relative to the two parties involved in the conflict: the insurgent group and the state in 
their struggle for power. 
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a. Dependence on a Particular Information Technology System 
The dependence upon one information system by either the insurgents or 
the government is not only an indicator of its use but also determines any counter uses 
within a conflict. A technology used before a conflict will likely remain in use once a 
conflict ensues. If this tool is used over an extended period of time without mishap or 
compromise, there will be a built-in dependence for that particular system. A dependence 
by either belligerent provides a target that may be too important to ignore. If the skills to 
counter this technology are not present within an organization, then the capability to out-
source and hire the necessary intellectual and individual resources will surely exist. Back-
up systems are a necessity. Surprisingly, the inability for government bureaucrats to adapt 
to new technologies may provide some built-in redundancy for the government. A 
government slow to move to emerging technologies or hesitant to give up old practices 
provides some protection against catastrophic attacks on particular information systems. 
The time and extent of use of a particular system will determine the degree of dependence. 
The longer the practice and greater the extent, the larger the impact of disruption. 
b. Civil Liberties Adhered to Within a Society 
If the above criteria describe those environments in which the use of 
information technologies present likely targets, this factor addresses how those targets 
may be attacked. Every society lies somewhere between total freedom and total 
oppression, where the concepts of freedom are simply not present. To determine the 
presence and impact of this factor, one cannot take government policy and laws at face 
value. A study must look at the governmental practices and its reactions under pressure to 
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detennine how this factor will affect an internal war. In societies where civil liberties are 
the norm, the insurgents will be able to hide behind many of the government's own 
systems to achieve some freedom of action. However, once this freedom encroaches on 
the freedoms of others, a government's reactionary process should be studied to detennine 
how it can be used by the insurgents. In societies where civil liberties are not the norm, a 
government's over-zealous use offorce can be a tool through which the insurgents ignite 
internal decent. Whichev~r the case, the civil liberties within a society play an important 
part of when and hoW a government reacts to dissent within the society. 
The two factors identified above as well as the others identified previously 
in this chapter will be added to the framework presented earlier in Figure 2. 
E. CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS 
The factors that will influence the use of information technologies in any ongoing 
or future internal conflict have been discussed and identified above. These factors are 
added to the framework presented earlier, and the results are shown in Figure 3 below. 
These factors can be studied to detennine the extent to which information technologies 
can influence the outcome of any particular insurgency. 
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Figure 3. Irrt1uential Factors in the Use of Information Technologies 
Involvement in any future guerrilla campaign as a participant will be undertaken 
from one of two perspectives: as an insurgent or as a supporter of a state government. A 
supporter of a state should study the factors identified along the lines that emanate from 
the state government portion of the diagram above to determine where susceptibilities and 
capabilities exist in any struggle. Analysts as well as participants should study the 
opposite portion of the diagram, from the insurgents' perspective, to identify strengths and 
weaknesses in the insurgents' attempts to influence both the state's population and the 
international community. This analysis can be used to determine how a state may disrupt, 
as shown on the dotted arrows above, any attempt by the insurgents to use information 
technology to aid in their attempt to undermine the standing government. 
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The list of factors identified throughout this chapter is not designed to be an all-
inclusive list. Factors that arise based on specific conflicts, because of cultural or societal 
conditions, should also be added and incorporated into any analysis. . It must also be 
remembered that the true impact of the influences of information technologies on societies 
as a whole is far from complete. As information tools are developed and implemented by 
societies, this framework should be reexamined to identify relevant emerging factors. 
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m. APPLICATIONS TO THE FUTURE 
The factors identified in Chapter II are a starting point in the analysis of the impact of 
infonnation technologies on future internal conflicts. These factors, however, are largely I 
dependent upon the adversary a government or insurgent group faces. Discussions 
throughout Chapter II indicate that having either a robust or nonexistent information 
technology capability is directly relative to the capabilities of your opponent. This chapter 
will go one step further, beyond identification of factors, to determine in which situations 
it will be in the best interest of a belligerent force to implement certain characteristics of an 
information technology strategy. In which situations does the relative advantage lie in 
implementing an offensive and in which a defensive information technology strategy? 
A. THE UNEVEN FUTURE BATTLEFIELD 
The future insurgency battlefield will take place on uneven technological ground. 
The future, like the past, will present conflicts in which one side of a struggle will hold a 
technological advantage over an adversary. Like conventional weaponry, information 
technology is an asset, the possession of which provides some relative strength to its user. 
However, unlike with conventional weaponry, the extent of the advantage will be 
dependent upon the capabilities of the adversary. An information technology tool is only 
as effective as the target it is intended to be used against. A technology that passes 
millions of pieces of information not received by anyone is worthless to a user. An 
information tool researched, developed, and implemented that has no target consumes 
resources that can best be used for some other purpose. 
Conflict is an interactive process. What may be successful against one adversary 
may be useless against another. Much like the environmental factors that are at play in 
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any conflict, the techniques and practices of one side of a conflict are always dependent 
upon the actions and reactions of the opposing side. For the U.S. military for instance, 
what was applicable in the jungles of Vietnam was not relevant in the deserts of Kuwait. 
The relative use and employment of information technologies also depends on the 
capabilities of the opposition. 
What constitutes a high or low information technology capability? A frame for 
perception is necessary in order to analyze the relationship between belligerents with 
different capabilities in an internal conflict. The description below will aid in framing the 
perceptions and referencing the capabilities of either force. For a reader, a frame is 
necessary before further comparison of the capabilities and limitations of opposing forces 
is attempted. 
The high technology force of the future will look· much like the United States of 
today. The military, as well as the society at large, will possess a robust information. 
technology capability. This capability will include multiple sources of credible news 
agencies as well as an interconnected society that can receive and respond to the 
information at large. The high-tech military of the future will incorporate many of the 
means to communicate within a society to further the military's command and control 
(C2) capability. This capability will include offensive measures designed to attack an 
. opponent's communication and information capability. The force of the future will also 
possess a defensive capability designed to prevent the disruption of its own 
communications systems. 
The low information technology society of the future will look much like the , 
country of Somalia today. This society will possess little, if any, information technology 
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capability. Information will primarily be spread via word of mouth. Even the use of 
written language material will be limited by the literacy rate within the country. Besides 
the oral communications issued by military leaders, the signaling capability of a military 
source will include the antiquated means of beating drums or the use of signaling flags. 
Legitimate news agencies will be nonexistent, and the means to promote newsworthy 
issues will be limited in both scope and scale. This low-tech society will possess neither 
the aptitude nor the resources to incorporate any of the information technologies being 
developed throughout the rest of the world. 
It becomes apparent that the majority of the states throughout the world fall 
somewhere between the U.S .. and Somalia in their information technology capabilities. 
Whether the Western European states that approach the capabilities of the U.S. or the 
many underdeveloped states found throughout Africa, most countries possess some level 
of information technology capability. The relative information capability of any country 
limits both a government's and an insurgent force's ability to maximize the uses of 
information technologies in an internal conflict. 
B. INTERACTIVITY BETWEEN IDGH-LOW TECHNOLOGY 
Figure 4, shown below, indicates the relationship that exists between a high-tech 
insurgent force or state and a low-tech insurgent force or state. This graph lays out a 
foundation for the application of an information technology strategy relative to the 
capabilities that a government has and how they are affected by the adversary it faces. 
The graph addresses the strategy ofa government's use of information technology as well 
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Figure 4. Interrelationship between High-Low Tech Opponents 
The figure above indicates that in a scenario in which both the government and the 
insurgents possess a high technology capability, both offensive and defensive capabilities 
must be emphasized. A government must protect its resources to defend against attack by 
an adversary. These defensive characteristics Will include redundant systems, safeguards 
against exposure, and a tendency to be systematic in its approaches to the applications of 
information technologies. A government's offensive tools must also be employed as 
quickly as possible to force an insurgent organization into a reactionary mode. The speed 
with which either force employs an information technology capability is essential to 
realizing marginal returns before an enemy can counter and diminish a capability. 
The sector that describes the low-tech government facing the high-tech insurgents 
indicates the use of a different strategy. The government should use all means at its 
disposal to implement its offensive capabilities. If these capabilities do not exist within a 
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government, then the bureaucratic organization should look to outsourcing this task either 
within the society or from resources outside its borders. Defensive concerns are negligible 
if a government possesses nothing to protect. A government in this situation should also 
leverage the advantages belonging to a standing government within the international 
community to ihfluence world opinion in its favor. A low-tech government must not trade 
information inferiority for military force superiority. A government must guard against 
aggressive or violent reactions directed at its citizenry in an environment in which its 
opponent has the ability to advertise governmental indiscretions. 
In the high-tech government against a low-tech insurgent force scenario, an 
emphasis on internal, defensively oriented information technologies becomes paramount. 
A government emphasis must be on the protection of standing information systems. The 
largest threat that the government faces is to the information systems that distribute and 
pass information as part of its administrative capabilities. Any offensive capabilities should 
be directed toward the international community to gain the freedom of maneuverability to 
combat the insurgents without international interference. An internal defensive strategy 
combined with an external offensive strategy is the optimal approach for a high-te<:;h 
government facing a low-tech insurgent force. 
The last sector of the graph demonstrates the confrontation between a low-tech 
state and a low-tech insurgent force. In this confrontation, any advantage that can be 
obtained from the use of information technologies can be maximized through speed. The 
speed in which a government employs a technology will determine the marginal returns of 
a particular information tool. Speed of application is not inherently a government 
strength. Levels of bureaucracy slow the time between decision and application. The 
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insurgents, who do not face such suffocating bureaucratic requirements, may be able to 
implement a technology in a more rapid manner. The speed at which each adversary 
applies a technology may provide an initial advantage that a late arriver finds hard to 
overcome, as well as maximizing the marginal returns of a specific tool. 
The graph demonstrates that a standard use or approach to the employment of 
information technologies does not exist. Whether a government takes an aggressive 
offensive or defensive approach to the employment of information technologies is 
dependent upon the opposition it faces. When the returns from the employment of an 
information technology do not meet the costs of that technology, resources are· not 
maximized. In a world in which stable or shrinking resources chase stable or expanding 
demands, the efficient use of resources must be maximized to meet the requirements of a 
national leadership. 
C. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has intenionally been left vague as to what constitutes an information 
technology. Mass media, interconnected computers, microprocessors, cellular 
communications, and similar advances have all changed not only the way a society 
communicates but also how it reacts to the overwhelming information available. The 
extent of this reaction and the further actions of a society are yet to be determined. The 
identifying of specific information tools has been left open so that this paper remains viable 
in an environment of constant· change. Analysis of the true impact of information 
technologies on society will be a task for future historians. Constant analysis and 
anticipation of the impacts of information technologies in an environment of constant 
change is a requirement for effective policymakers of today. 
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This process has identified certain factors that can be used as a framework to 
determine susceptibilities and capabilities within the communication requirements of any 
internal conflict. Complete analysis of these factors, plus any developed later, can aid a 
government or insurgent group in determining where advantages may lay in any guerrilla 
war. These advantages or susceptibilities must then be viewed· through the relative 
strengths and weaknesses of an opponent to develop a strategy toward the employment of 
any specific information technology. This process provides military and national leaders 
an approach to confronting the demands of insurgency conflict and how information 
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